INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis, which began in the summer of 2007, brought about extraordinary and increased intervention in the financial sector by various developed countries and their central banks.' These countries and associated central banks include the United States' Federal Reserve, the United Kingdom's Bank of England, and the European Union's European Central Bank.
2 Most increased intervention occurred through each central bank's lender of last resort facility. 3 According to classical central bank ideology, one of the main functions of a central bank's lender of last resort facility is to provide liquidity to illiquid institutions facing a temporary shortage of cash. 4 The recent global financial crisis stretched this classical ideal to its limit. 5 Historically, before a central bank lent its taxpayer's money to private institutions, the central bank would determine whether the institution requesting money was illiquid or insolvent. 6 While illiquidity is a sign that a bank could be insolvent, it alone is not determinative of insolvency.
Therefore, in order to protect illiquid banks from the stigma attached to using the same lender of last resort facility as insolvent banks, secrecy exists regarding the disclosure of traditional lender of last resort loans made to financial institutions. 9 In response to the recent global financial crisis, central banks assumed much greater lender of last resort power in an effort to stabilize the financial system.'o For example, central banks began "bailing out" institutions that were facing insolvency." Because institutions facing insolvency are riskier than institutions facing illiquidity, central banks have been under pressure to disclose their use of taxpayer funds in such transactions. Some disclosure proposals specifically focused on lifting the veil of secrecy in the United States Federal Reserve's primary lender of last resort facility, the Discount Window. Northern Rock's disclosure showed that news of a single bank's financial troubles could set off a chain of events that could cripple a global economy. 2 ' Therefore, in order to lift the veil of central bank secrecy while protecting the institutions that use a central bank's lender of last resort facilities, disclosure of the use of lender of last resort facilities should only occur for high-risk institutions.
This Note examines the increasing transparency in central banks and whether such transparency should be extended to a central bank's lender of last resort facilities. Part I analyzes the traditional roles and legal foundations of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank. Part II discusses lender of last resort theory and its implementation in the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank. Part III explores central bank secrecy. Part IV outlines the myriad of central bank responses to the financial crisis. Finally, Part V posits that the Discount Window disclosure requirements in Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act are too broad. Instead of requiring the disclosure of all Discount Window facility usage, the Federal Reserve should only be required to disclose Discount Window loans made to risky institutions.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLES OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, BANK OF

ENGLAND, AND EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
The Federal Reserve System, Bank of England, and European Central Bank are all central banks that function in the same broad manner.
22 A central bank is defined as the " [p] rincipal monetary authority of a nation, which performs several key functions, including conducting monetary policy to stabilize the economy and level of prices." 23 The need for a national central bank and unified monetary policy arose from the vulnerability of the nineteenth and early twentieth century United States' banking system. In that period, the "failure of the [United States'] banking system to effectively provide funding to troubled depository institutions contributed significantly to the economy's vulnerability to ,,24 fi financial panics.
The failure was caused by the unavailability of short-term credit from the government, which banks rely on when they have a series of unexpected withdrawals. 
A. The Federal Reserve System -Central Bank of the United States of America
The Central Bank of the United States is the Federal Reserve System, 26 which derives its legal authority from the Federal Reserve Act.
27
The Federal Reserve's operational framework is described as being "independent within the government" because it is supervised by Congress but operated by presidentially-appointed and congressionally-approved economists. 28 The duties of the Federal Reserve fall into four general areas: conducting monetary policy with an eye toward "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates"; "supervising and regulating banking institutions"; ensuring the stability of the financial system and minimizing any risk in the financial markets; and "providing 29 financial services to depository institutions" and governments.
B. The Bank of England -Central Bank of the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's central bank is the Bank of England. The European Central Bank is also responsible for the implementation of monetary policy, smooth operation of payment systems, and financial stability and supervision. The monetary policy task is most relevant to this Note and includes promoting price stability, fostering a high level of employment, and creating sustainable and noninflationary growth.
The European Central Bank is markedly different in structure than its counterparts in the United States and England due to its multinational jurisdiction.
3 9 The European Central Bank is part of the larger European System of Central Banks. 40 The European System of Central Banks consists of the European Central Bank and individual national central banks, regardless of whether they have adopted the euro. 4 
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Central Bank is also part of the Eurosystem, a governing body for individual national banks that have adopted the euro.
42
Unlike the Federal Reserve and Bank of England, the European Central Bank does not act on its own accord when it conducts monetary policy operations. 43 Instead, each individual national bank in the European System of Central Banks carries out its monetary policy independent of the European Central Bank's directives. 44 However, banks within the Eurosystem must act in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the European Central Bank. 45 Therefore, the European Central Bank functions on two levels. First, it directs the monetary policy actions of central banks that are within the Eurosystem. 46 Second, it hopes to influence the monetary policy actions of central banks that are within the European System of Central Banks but are not within the Eurosystem. 
II. THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
On a basic level, central banks provide liquidity instead of capital to financial institutions. 48 Liquidity is the "ability to convert an asset to cash quickly."4 9 In contrast, capital is simply "financial assets." 50 Therefore, by synthesizing the basic role of a central bank with the definitions of liquidity and capital, it follows that a central bank should facilitate actions, such as providing liquidity, that make it easier for a financial institution to function. 5 ' However, a central bank should not take actions that enable a financial institution to function, such as providing capital. 52 To help achieve the goal of providing liquidity to financial institutions, all three central banks serve as the lender of last resort for financial institutions under their control. 3 The lender of last resort facility has two features that make it different from other central bank functions. 
A. Overview ofLender ofLast Resort Theory
The lender of last resort facility has four pillars that central banks have historically used as a basis for lending to financial institutions. Before the recent global financial crisis, central banks generally adhered to these four pillars when undertaking lender of last resort lending. However, as the financial crisis worsened, central banks strayed from the four pillars.
9
The first pillar is that assistance should be given to banks that are illiquid but not insolvent. 60 However, because illiquidity is a sign of possible insolvency, the distinction between the two may be difficult to discern. 6 1 The second pillar states that assistance should be given at a high rate of interest to compensate for the risk of lending to an illiquid institution. 62 In other words, because the central bank is the lender of last resort, a barrier in the form of a high or penalty-like interest rate should be established in order to prevent individual financial institutions from encountering any moral hazard problems.
Moral hazard, defined as the "incentive to take unusual risks,"" can arise due to the relative ease of access to emergency funds via the lender of last resort facility. 65 Third, assistance should be given to banks that can provide adequate and safe collateral.
Fourth, a central bank should disperse lender of last resort funds in a discretionary manner.
A "widespread reluctance to allow banks to fail, even when clearly insolvent" has led central banks to stray from the four traditional pillars of lender of last resort lending.
This reluctance to allow failure may be The lender of last resort facility, due to its ability to provide immediate and unlimited liquidity, is an important aspect of a central bank's operations during times of individual, national, or international crises. 72 In addition, the lender of last resort facility "functions as a safety valve . . .; in circumstances where extensions of credit can help relieve liquidity strains in the banking system, the [lender of last resort] also helps to assure the basic stability of financial markets."
The ability of a central bank to rapidly respond to a crisis through its lender of last resort facility is crucial. 74 As demonstrated by the financial turmoil that began in 2007, financial crises can have broad economic effects." Thus, immediate access to liquidity can be "very important for containing the spread of a financial crisis that can have significant In the Federal Reserve System, the lender of last resort facility is called the Discount Window.
7 7 "The Discount Window is the long-standing program through which the twelve Federal Reserve Banks make short-term loans (often overnight) to depository institutions, and it can serve as 'an emergency, back-up source of liquidity' for borrowing depository institutions that lack other options."
78 Specifically, the Discount Window can be used to supply temporary funding to institutions experiencing significant financial difficulties if that institution's collapse would have an adverse effect on the financial system. 79 In addition, the Discount Window may be used cautiously to help facilitate the "orderly resolution of a failing institution."so These various uses have caused the Discount Window to be described as a "sort of soup kitchen for the waifs and strays of America's banking world. When lenders are in dire straits and no one else will heed their cries for help, there's always Uncle Sam, in the form of the . . . Discount Window, as a final port of call."
The Discount Window is also important to the United States because it helps control the federal funds rate. 82 The federal funds rate is the "[r]ate charged by a depository institution on an overnight loan of federal funds to another depository institution; [the] rate may vary from day to day and from bank to bank." 83 Controlling the federal funds rate through the Discount Window is essential to the Federal Reserve because the "Federal Reserve implements monetary policy through its control over the federal funds rate." 84 To receive credit through the Discount Window, a bank must present sufficient collateral to the Federal Reserve.
Once sufficient collateral is presented, there are three types of credit available through the Discount 
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Window. The first type of credit is primary credit. Primary credit is generally available to financially sound financial institutions on an overnight basis. 88 Primary credit is a back-up source of funding for banks in occasional need of temporary liquidity. 89 Therefore, as a penalty for using the Discount Window, the primary credit rate is typically 100 basis points (one percent) above the target federal funds rate and is commonly called the discount rate. 90 Secondary credit is available to institutions ineligible for primary credit. 9 ' These institutions are typically less financially sound than institutions that are able to take advantage of primary credit.
92 Therefore, the interest rate associated with secondary credit is 150 basis points above the target federal funds rate. 93 Finally, the Federal Reserve also offers seasonal credit through the Discount Window. 94 Seasonal credit is available to small firms that experience "significant seasonal swings in their loans and deposits." 95 Generally speaking, banks in agricultural and tourist areas qualify for seasonal credit.
Therefore, unlike Discount Window lending using primary or secondary credit, seasonal credit is not used by institutions facing financial difficulties. 97 Operational Standing Facilities are composed of two parts: a depositing facility and a lending facility. 3 4 Important to this Note is the lending facility, which enables a bank to borrow overnight funds from the Bank of England against sufficient collateral for a penalty rate of seventy-five basis points. 05 Financial institutions that need longer-term help use the Discount Window Facility instead of the Operational Standing Lending Facility. "The purpose of the [Discount Window Facility] is to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system. The Discount Window Facility is not intended for firms facing fundamental problems of solvency or viability."'o 7 Therefore, the Bank of England's Discount Window Facility was not designed to be used by institutions in need of a government bailout to continue operations even though it has a longer-term lending period than the Operational Standing Facility.' 08 Borrowers from the Discount Window Facility are required to borrow funds for either 30 days or 364 days. 09 The penalty rate for Discount Window Facility lending is generally based on the type of collateral that a financial institution is able to provide."o Therefore, the penalty lending rate is lower if a bank is able to provide high quality collateral."' If high quality collateral is provided, the Discount Window Facility minimum Another argument in favor of central bank secrecy was that the central bank serves as the lender of last resort. 
C The Sterling Monetary Framework: The Lender ofLast Resort in the Bank of England
B. Recent Increases in Central Bank Transparency
The cloud of secrecy surrounding central banks began to lift recently. In recent years, however, the regulatory system not only failed to manage risk, it also failed to require disclosure of risk through sufficient transparency. American financial markets are profoundly dependent upon transparency. After all, the fundamental risk/reward corollary depends on the ability of market participants to have confidence in their ability to accurately judge risk.'
36
Increased central bank transparency reflects the efficient market hypothesis, which is the idea that market participants will make the best decision if they have all available market, or in this case, central bank In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, increased transparency is generally a positive and necessary component of the market. 138 Moreover, secrecy is against the principles of the efficient market hypothesis and therefore should be avoided under efficient market hypothesis ideology.1 39 "Today's changing financial environment demands more transparent Federal Reserve monetary policy. Such transparency would to help establish understandable rules and procedures, eliminate unnecessary market uncertainties and volatility, and to minimize the costs of anti-inflation monetary policy." 43 A simplified view of the benefits of increased central bank transparency is that "greater transparency is beneficial, improving democratic accountability by making it easier to judge whether a central bank is committed to its announced policy and improving policy effectiveness by facilitating the interpretation of policy changes."" In addition, there is some empirical data suggesting that increased central bank transparency leads to real-world benefits.' 4 5
C. Criticism of Increased Central Bank Transparency
The increase in central bank transparency is not without criticism. One view is that "transparency should not be seen as good for whatever ails 
D. Increased Transparency and the Lender of Last Resort
Most historical increases in central bank transparency dealt with macroeconomic monetary policy, not with the lender of last resort function."' 9 However, increased transparency regarding the lender of last resort is prevalent within the Bank of England.' 60 Sir Edward George, former Governor of the Bank of England, wrote that the disclosure of lender of last resort usage should be kept secret until the risk of market volatility passes. 16 ' To this end, the Bank of England has statutorily mandated the disclosure of the aggregate usage of the Operational Lending Facility only after an appropriate time period has passed.1 62 However, this disclosure does not require Discount Window Facility disclosure and does not require disclosure of the names and financial details of individual institutions receiving funds through either facility. 
IV. LENDER OF LAST RESORT AND THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
The recent global financial crisis has been characterized by some economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.' 6 7 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said that the "current crisis has been one of the most difficult financial and economic episodes in modern history. 
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global economies, most analysts who studied the economic crisis agree that it began with the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, which began showing its severity in 2007.169
A. Events Contributing to the Financial Crisis
The subprime mortgage crisis was a "financial crisis that arose in the mortgage market after a sharp increase in mortgage foreclosures, mainly subprime, collapsed numerous mortgage lenders and hedge funds."' 7 0 A subprime mortgage is a "type of mortgage that is normally made out to borrowers with lower credit ratings."' 7 In turn, banks typically charge a higher rate of interest to subprime borrowers in order to compensate for their increased risk of default. When payments were not being made by the borrowers, CDO investors also stopped receiving payment. so The severity of the crisis became clear in July and August 2007 when investment banks Bear Steams and BNP Paribas informed investors they would receive little, if any, money from their CDO-backed investment funds.
18 ' Additionally, banks are required to keep a minimum amount of capital on hand and will normally loan capital amounts in excess of the minimum to banks in need of capital via the interbank loan market.1 82 As worries began to surface about the amount of subprime investments banks held and the potential for losses from such investments, the interbank loan markets in both New York and London began to dry up.' 83 In addition, European insurance and banking giant Fortis was nationalized to ensure that it could continue its operations. 220 Finally, the large increase in the extension of credit by commercial banks to less than creditworthy individuals and entities also contributed to the financial crisis. 22 1 "Aspects of this broader credit boom included widespread declines in underwriting standards, breakdowns in lending oversight by investors and rating agencies, increased reliance on complex and opaque credit instruments that proved fragile under stress, and unusually low compensation for risk-taking."
22 2 "These events prompted a huge increase in perceived counterparty risk as banks faced large writedowns, the solvency of many of the most established financial names came into question, the demand for liquidity jumped to new heights, and market volatility surged once more." 2 23
B. Central Bank Response to the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis showed that banks were unwilling to lend, even to other banks, no matter how much of their own money was available. 224 For example, the European Central Bank's deposit facility saw increased usage during the financial crisis as banks "saved up" their liquidity instead of lending to other banks.
25
Therefore, to combat the liquidity freeze, most central banks expanded their traditional lender of last resort roles.
226
Lender of last resort expansion was accomplished by conducting financial operations that were larger than usual or different from their regular schedule.
227
For example, central banks tried to keep markets liquid by ensuring there was adequate overnight funding through their short-term The Federal Reserve also took steps to restore the credit markets to functionality and provide liquidity to the private sector. 236 In doing so, the Federal Reserve "deployed a number of additional policy tools, some of which were previously in [their] toolkit and some of which ha[d] been created as the need arose." 2 37 One tool that the Federal Reserve used, like all central banks, was increased communication with the markets about its expectations of market conditions during the financial crisis.
23 8 In addition to traditional policy tools, the Federal Reserve began using an "extraordinary" set of tools.
3 9
Over the course of the crisis, the [Federal Reserve] has taken a number of extraordinary actions to ensure that financial institutions have adequate access to short-term credit. These actions include creating new facilities for auctioning credit and making primary securities dealers, as well as banks, eligible to borrow at the [ In explaining the risk involved with these extraordinary actions, Federal Reserve officials stated that the "the provision of credit to financial institutions exposes the Federal Reserve to only minimal credit risk; the loans that we make to banks and primary dealers through our various facilities are generally overcollateralized and made with recourse to the borrowing firm." 24 1 An overcollateralized loan is a loan where more collateral than what would normally be necessary is given to the bank in order to fund the loan.
242 A loan made with recourse simply means that the lender, in this case the Federal Reserve, has the right to collect on the collateral. 24 3 Therefore, the "Federal Reserve has never suffered any losses in the course of its normal lending to banks." 2 4
The Federal Reserve also created new lending programs that were designed to serve another classic central bank purpose as "liquidity provider of last resort." 24 5 These actions included providing liquidity for both the commercial paper and money market mutual funds markets.
24 6 The Federal Reserve purchased, and thus removed from the market, longer-term securities in exchange for more liquid, shorter-term assets that went to the market in order to help keep money in the financial market flowing. The European Central Bank also took steps to ensure that its marginal lending facility was widely available for use in order to help facilitate the flow of liquidity.
262 Such actions included changing the interest rate of its overnight loans and fine-tuning overnight loan operations in order to ease money flow, refinancing longer-term loans, performing various reserve management operations, and participating with foreign central banks in coordinated liquidity-easing ventures.
263
C. Current State ofReform and Increased Transparency
Opposition to increased activity by the United States' Federal Reserve was used to push for proposals to limit the power of the Federal Reserve. In the United States, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street In its making of monetary policy, the [Federal Reserve] is highly transparent, providing detailed minutes of policy meetings and regular testimony before Congress, among other information. Our financial statements are public and audited by an outside accounting firm; we publish our balance sheet weekly; and we provide monthly reports with extensive information on all the temporary lending facilities developed during the crisis. Congress, through the Government Accountability Office, can and does audit all parts of our operations except for the monetary policy deliberations and actions covered by the 1978 exemption. The general repeal of that exemption would serve only to increase the perceived influence of Congress on monetary policy decisions, which would undermine the confidence the public and the markets have in the [Federal Reserve] to act in the long-term economic interest of the nation. 286 At first glance, the Federal Reserve appears to be in a contradictory position. The Federal Reserve believes transparency is a vital part of the modern economy.
2 8 7 However, the Federal Reserve advocates for secrecy when it feels that it is in the best interest of the market to do so.
2 88 Central bank transparency, in general, has helped the financial markets become more efficient by helping market participants make more informed decisions.
2 89 However, as the Northern Rock disclosure shows, there is the possibility that the market can receive too much information, or at least too much information at an improper time, causing market panic. 290 According to the Bank of International Settlements, a "standing lending facility is a widely adopted central bank instrument for providing liquidity insurance against frictional problems in payment systems and overnight money markets.
However The Bank of England's Operational Standing Facility provides a model as a backstop to the interbank lending market because its main purpose is to help banks in times of unexpected payment shock.
00
This would be a benign or safe lending program since it would involve banks with a financially sound balance sheet. This lending program would ensure that commercial banks have immediate access to liquidity, even when there was "unexpected friction" in the market.o'
In order to keep stigma away from this program, disclosure of financial institutions using the benign program would not be allowed. Non- 
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[Vol. 21:1 disclosure for overnight lending should increase the willingness of financial institutions to use this new facility and thus, reduce any possibility for stigma to exist. 30 2 Instead of full disclosure, as currently mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Federal Reserve should only report aggregate statistics of usage, interest income generated, and losses. Disclosure of the names or financial details of users of this program should never be disclosed. Since institutions using this facility would be financially sound, there should be no worry from taxpayers or government officials that funds were being used unwisely. "If anonymity is not well preserved . . . then there is a greater risk that borrowing from standing facilities would be regarded as a sign of borrower weakness. When this occurs, the effectiveness of these facilities as a liquidity backstop is severely impaired." 303 The second lending program, much like the Bank of England's Discount Window Facility, would be established to help banks acquire liquidity, but not capital, if they were in dire financial straits.
Due to the increased risk of this secondary lending program, the Federal Reserve should require prospective borrowers to post more collateral than necessary in order to protect the taxpayers from unnecessary loss. Additionally, like the Discount Window Facility, this program should require loan terms of 30 or 364 days in order to ensure that these riskier institutions do not rush loan repayment and end up with the same sort of risk that forced the institution to initially seek government assistance. Since these transactions are likely to be smaller in number but greater in scope than the transactions of the benign program, secrecy should be maintained, but only for as long as necessary. Disclosure should occur after the Federal Reserve determines that the market and the institution receiving funds could adequately handle disclosure without subsequent panic, or after two years, whichever occurs first. 305 This disclosure requirement falls in line with the current requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 306 In times of financial crisis, this long-term lending program for risky institutions could be used in combination with Section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act to create innovative financial solutions to combat any future crises. The creative aspect of Section 13.3 was used in the current financial crisis with great success: The Bank of England's lender of last resort facilities provide a reallife model for the Federal Reserve, and other similarly situated central banks, to follow in order to protect both taxpayers, through increased disclosure, and lender of last resort users, through non-disclosure of safe lending programs. In addition, 
